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SOCIAL POLICY 
 
Case 43/75 Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne 
(SABENA) [1976] ECR 455, [1976] 2 CMLR 98 a.k.a. Defrenne II) 
 
 
 
The principle of equality between the sexes is now recognised as a cornerstone of EC 
Law and there are numerous legislative instruments and a plethora of case law to 
support its application. However, despite the reference to ‘equal pay for equal work’ 
in Article 119 (now 144) of the Treaty of Rome, the impact of European law on the 
furtherance of social as well as economic objectives was not widely acknowledged in 
the early days of European integration.  
 
In the early 1970s a Belgian air hostess commenced proceedings against her 
employers which resulted in three early references for preliminary rulings under the 
Article 177 EC (now Article 234) procedure. Gabrielle Defrenne’s litigation was 
based on the various forms of discrimination she had been subjected to on the grounds 
of her sex and the most celebrated of the cases, referred to widely as Defrenne II, 
concerns her equal pay claim.   
 
The European Court of Justice’s ruling in this case is interesting in three important 
respects: it added to the developing jurisprudence on the direct effect of Treaty 
provisions; it dealt with the difficult policy issue of retroactivity in claims for 
damages; and, perhaps most importantly, it laid the foundations for the future 
development of EC sex equality law and formed the basis of the European Court of 
Justice’s relationship with what has become known as ‘the social dimension’.     
 
The facts were as follows. Gabrielle Defrenne, an air hostess, brought an action for 
compensation against the airline that employed her on the grounds of discrimination 
in pay.  From February 1963 until February 1966, she had been paid less than men 
who were doing the same job. Her employers did not dispute that the work performed 
by male air stewards and female air hostesses was the same or that there was 
discrimination in the rates of pay applicable to men and women. As there was no 
remedy available under Belgian law for gender-based pay discrimination, Ms 
Defrenne sought to rely on Article 119 (now 141). Article 119 set out the principle 
that men and women ‘should receive equal pay for equal work’. The Belgian appeal 
court, the Cour du Travail, referred the case to the European Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling under Article 234 (ex 177) on two counts. First, whether Article 
119 of the Treaty of Rome was directly effective, in other words, whether its inclusion 
in the Treaty introduced the principle of equal pay for equal work directly into the 
national law of each Member State, thereby entitling workers to institute proceedings 
before national courts to ensure its observance and, if so, from which date. Second, 
the Cour du Travail asked if Article 119 was directly applicable in Member States or 
whether its application depended on it being adopted by national law.   
 
The application of Article 119 to the Defrenne case was in relation to obligations 
which fall on individuals (i.e. employer and employee). This is known as horizontal 
direct effect. Vertical direct effect arises where a Treaty obligation falls on a Member 
State itself and reflects the relationship between the individual and the State (Van 
Duyn). Ms Defrenne’s reliance on Article 119 arose due to the Belgian legislature’s 
reluctance to implement the principle of equal pay into national law.  Belgium was 
not alone in failing to fulfil its obligation in this way. Article 119 was intended to be 
implemented by Member States by the end of the transitional period (December 
1961).  Although this deadline was moved to the end of 1964, it had still not been met 
at that date by several Member States. The Commission had threatened to bring 
infringement proceedings against Member States not complying by July 1973, but this 
threat was never carried out.  In February 1975 the Council issued the Equal Pay 
Directive (75/117/EC) for implementation by July 1976. 
 
The Aim of Article 119 
 
In considering the objectives set out in the Treaty of Rome, the Court identified the 
underlying rationale for the inclusion of Article 119 (now 141) thus: 
 
Article 119 [now 141] pursues a double aim. First, in the light of the different 
states of the development of social legislation in the various Member States, 
the aim of Article 119 is to avoid a situation in which undertakings established 
in States which have actually implemented the principle of equal pay suffer a 
competitive disadvantage in intra-Community competition as compared with 
undertakings established in States which have not yet eliminated 
discrimination against women workers as regards pay. 
Secondly, this provision forms part of the social objectives of the Community, 
which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by 
common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant development 
of the living and working conditions of their peoples…This double aim which 
is at once economic and social, shows that the principle of equal pay forms 
part of the foundations of the community.     
 
In its clear recognition of the existence of the social as well as economic objectives of 
Community law, the Court can be said to have refocused the scope of the founding 
Treaty and, thus, assured the future development of European Community sex 
discrimination law.  This aspect was highly controversial at the time of the ruling. The 
newly established European Economic Community was viewed primarily as a vehicle 
for the avoidance of future armed conflict in Europe which, it was envisaged would 
best be achieved through the attainment of economic prosperity and market 
integration.  The remainder of the social provisions within the Treaty are drafted in a 
manner which appears aspirational rather than likely to give rise to specific legal 
rights. The Court’s interpretation of Article 119 as being capable of giving 
individually enforceable rights has been central to its subsequent jurisprudence on sex 
equality and has also served as an important foundation for the establishment of a 
European social dimension to the law-making capacity of the EC institutions. 
   
Equal Pay as a ‘Principle’ 
 
In its ruling, the European Court stated that the fact that Article 119 refered to equal 
pay as a ‘principle’ gave it a specific status within the European legal order which 
made it ‘impossible to put forward an argument against its direct effect’ (Para 28).  
The subjective nature of Article 119’s wording meant that the scope of ‘equal pay’ 
and ‘equal work’ would have to be determined by the Court. On the issue of the 
horizontal application of Article 119, the Court found that the Article was directly 
effective and not limited to public authorities but also covered the relationship 
between individuals as ‘the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally 
addressed to the Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the 
same time on any individual who has an interest in the duties thus laid down’. (Para 
31). This means that the rights bestowed by Article 119 apply directly to individuals 
and do not require implementation by Member States.  The Article can, thus, be 
utilised against employers in both the public and private sectors without the need for 
equivalent rights under domestic legislation. In such cases, applicants must rely on the 
precise wording of the Article which becomes part of domestic law. It follows that in 
cases of conflict between the provisions of domestic law and Article 119, the latter 
must prevail.  
 
On the issue of legal certainty, although Article 119 was found to be ‘sufficiently 
precise’ to be capable of having direct effect, the Court drew a distinction between 
‘direct and overt discrimination’ and ‘indirect and disguised discrimination’ in the pay 
of men and women.  The former, the Court held, is prohibited by Article 119 which is 
directly effective in this respect as it can be identified by national courts ‘solely with 
the aid of the criteria based on equal work and equal pay referred to by the article’.  
However, the prohibition of the latter by Article 119 lacked sufficient precision to be 
directly effective as it could be identified only by ‘reference to more explicit 
implementing provisions of a Community or national character.’ (p. 143). This 
distinction has been set aside over the intervening years so that Article 141 has been 
held to have direct effect in certain circumstances in which a finding of indirect rather 
than direct sex discrimination has been made – most notably in relation to inequalities 
of pay between part-time and full-time workers – see Bilka-Kaufhaus. 
 
The Temporal Limitation 
 
Retroactive application of the ruling was not allowed and a temporal limitation was 
imposed so that the judgment was only effective for the future. This meant that, with 
the exception of claims already submitted at the date of the ruling, back pay could not 
be claimed in respect of inequalities of pay relating to periods of service prior to that 
time. The Court was clear that limitations of the temporal effect of a ruling is an 
exceptional measure which should only be imposed on the grounds of legal certainty 
if the effects of the ruling would have a seriously disruptive effect – in this case the 
large numbers of backdated claims that would otherwise have been submitted would 
have had serious financial consequences for many organisations.  Nevertheless, the 
imposition of such a limitation has been criticised as a blatant example of judicial 
law-making by which the furtherance of social objectives are subordinated to the 
economic imperative. For a subsequent use of the imposition of a temporal limitation 
see Barber and, more recently, Preston on the application of Article 141 to 
occupational pension schemes.     
 
Developments since Defrenne II 
 
In giving its ruling, the Court isolated the stated principle of Article 119 - equal pay 
for equal work – and sidestepped consideration of the more complex, and wide-
reaching, question of equal value.  This is reflective of the conditions of the time in 
which blatant sex-based inequalities in pay of the kind identified in the Defrenne 
litigation were commonplace. Equal value, as a concept on which claims could be 
based, was very much in its infancy. In the intervening years, equal value has 
emerged as the most progressive provision on which to base claims and is now widely 
utilised. As the Court’s jurisprudence since Defrenne II has demonstrated, the ruling 
certainly has application in claims relating to work of equal value as well as work 
which is the same or broadly similar to that performed by a suitable comparator as it 
is the core principle of Article 119 which was considered to be sufficiently precise 
rather than the effect of its application in what might be considered less precise 
circumstances. Furthermore, subsequent legislative developments have seen the 
principle expanded, in part to take account of jurisprudential factors. 
 
Although Article 141 (ex 119) provided the only specific reference to equal treatment 
contained in the Treaty of Rome, it has served as a basis on which the principle of 
non-discrimination has been expanded beyond the originally narrow confines of equal 
pay.  The Treaty of Amsterdam made some important amendments in this respect, 
most notably by pronouncing ‘equality between men and women’ as one of the goals 
outlined in Article 2. Article 141 has itself been expanded to provide explicitly for the 
application of equal pay for ‘work of equal value’ in addition to the original reference 
to  ‘equal work’  and also refers to the principle of equal treatment in respect of action 
to promote equality.  
 In making its ruling in Defrenne II, the Court’s primary concerns were that Member 
States should not be able to escape obligations imposed by European law simply by 
refusing to transpose key principles into national law and that tardiness on the part of 
Community institutions should not be able to hamper the development of the 
Community’s aims. This was particularly important in the social context as the 
institutions of the time lacked the political will to prise open the window of 
opportunity presented by the Treaty’s inclusion of Article 119. Instead this was left to 
the European Court of Justice which, in its recognition of the EEC as a social as well 
as economic Community, laid the foundations for future development. In this respect, 
Defrenne II should be acknowledged as a pivotal case which helped to create an 
appropriate environment for the Court’s involvement in the birth of social action.  
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